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Abstract
Background: Human beings are an integral part of com-
puter security, whether we actively participate or simply
build the systems. Despite this importance, understand-
ing users and their interaction with security is a blind spot
for most security practitioners and designers.
Aim: Define principles for conducting experiments into
usable security and privacy, to improve study robustness
and usefulness.
Data: The authors’ experiences conducting several re-
search projects complemented with a literature survey.
Method: We extract principles based on relevance to the
advancement of the state of the art. We then justify our
choices by providing published experiments as cases of
where the principles are and are not followed in practice
to demonstrate the impact. Each principle is a discipline-
specific instantiation of desirable experiment-design ele-
ments as previously established in the domain of philos-
ophy of science.
Results: Five high-priority principles – (i) give par-
ticipants a primary task; (ii) incorporate realistic risk;
(iii) avoid priming the participants; (iv) perform double-
blind experiments whenever possible and (v) think care-
fully about how meaning is assigned to the terms threat
model, security, privacy, and usability.
Conclusion: The principles do not replace researcher
acumen or experience, however they can provide a valu-
able service for facilitating evaluation, guiding younger
researchers and students, and marking a baseline com-
mon language for discussing further improvements.
1 Introduction and aims
Security mechanisms are incorporated into IT systems to
protect them or the information they contain. Protection
can extend to the regular activities of users and the sys-
tems they interact with, relying on them to behave in a
secure manner. In the past, humans have been referred
to as the “weakest link” in security, where insecure ac-
tions – be they malicious or unintended – can jeopardise
systems and expose them to threats [55]. Research from
1999 onwards [1, 64] has shown that the systems them-
selves can introduce security weaknesses, by being un-
usable and a bad fit to the tasks performed by users of
those systems [53], in turn making secure behaviour dif-
ficult. Usability is then an important factor in the design
and deployment of security mechanisms, where treating
usability as an after-thought to be added to an existing
system can instead impact security [65].
Particularly for complex IT systems, users tend to fail
– rather than knowingly refuse – to comply with security
expectations [33]. Potential reasons why users do not
comply include: security-compliant behaviour demands
too much of them, the need to comply is not obvious to
the individual, or the definition of compliant behaviour
is simply unworkable. In all of these cases, individuals
may rationalise that behaving securely is not worth their
time or effort if there are no perceived personal bene-
fits [24]. The result of this rationalisation is often that
users develop coping strategies to reduce the demands of
security, work around security systems, or become disen-
franchised with security if it continues to act as a distrac-
tion and a barrier [2]. For instance, users may rationalise
when considering whether to maintain a written note of
a password as a recall aid, even though humans are not
adapted to such memory tasks.
The users’ efforts to make use of the system, by ratio-
nalisation or otherwise, often conflicts with the security
architects’ efforts to secure the system [61]. User efforts
to cope with the demands of security are only exacer-
bated by security architects who insist that users can be
trained to perform security tasks (e.g., [6]), even though
usable security research demonstrates that there are cases
where this is untrue [9]. Individuals and groups develop
their own alternatives to security if the security architec-
ture does not accommodate the users’ security needs. Of-
ten groups use their own approximation of what a secure
system should do while attempting to respect the need to
behave securely [34]. Mandates and restricted systems
further undermine users when security managers and de-
signers do not understand the user [25, 52]. Thus the
user aspect of the system cannot be avoided, ignored, or
designed out by the security architect.
The body of evidence in security usability is growing
both in general knowledge on how users make security
and privacy choices and also for the use and challenges
of specific technologies, such as encryption [64, 57, 49].
One notable development was the definition of “Grand
Challenges” for achieving user-centred security in 2005
by Zurko [67], stating that for those developing secure
systems:
“The body of experience testing the usabil-
ity of security both in the lab and in context
will define the techniques and tools we need
and can use. It will also generate a body of best
practice we can begin to systematize in check-
lists and expert evaluations.”
In this paper, we offer such a systematisation by pro-
ducing a set of principles for user studies of both secu-
rity and privacy. The principles complement each other,
and are interdependent. Such a set of principles can sup-
port the development of robust study outcomes, com-
parison of results across user studies, and composition
into a meaningful body of evidence centred around the
users’ security technology experience. We review a con-
cise set of experiments studying user security technology
use. The result of the review is five principles which can
be reviewed in advance of performing a study or to help
guide evaluation of past studies.
Zurko [67] states that explicit security mechanisms
that are incomprehensible to users and which are not in-
tegrated with the task are not effective. There is then a
need to capture end-user understanding of security and
how security fits with their activities. Researchers who
consider these principles will have a language to express
assurance that their study is applicable, consistent, reli-
able, and should be believed. Furthermore, the princi-
ples assist in establishing relationships among outcomes
of different studies on elements such as: identifying user
needs, user risk profiles, impact of using particular tech-
nologies, and the impact of certain more-or-less con-
trolled conditions of use. Findings can then be collated
within specialised frameworks, where efforts are already
underway in the research community – these include the
“human in the loop” framework developed by Cranor in
2008 [13], and a repository of behavioural science find-
ings as relate to IT-security [44].
The paper is arranged as follows: Section 2 describes
background on general rules of research validity; Sec-
tion 3 describes the process followed to derive the prin-
ciples; Section 4 details the recommended study princi-
ples for examining the usability of security and privacy
technologies. Discussion follows in Section 5, followed
by Conclusions.
2 Background
Hatleback and Spring [22] identify and explain four de-
sirable experiment design features by analogy with biol-
ogy that should apply to experiments in computing and
computing security, analogous to principles proposed
specifically in malware research [51]. The four princi-
ples are:
Internal validity: The experiment is of “suitable scope
to achieve the reported results” and is not “suscep-
tible to systematic error” [22, p. 451]
External validity: The result of the experiment “is not
solely an artifact of the laboratory setting” [22, p.
451]
Containment: No “confounds” in the results, and no
experimental “effects are a threat to safety” of the
participants, the environment, or society generally
[22, p. 452]
Transparency: “there are no explanatory gaps in the ex-
perimental mechanism” and the explanatory “dia-
gram for the experimental mechanism is complete”
in that it covers all relevant entities and activities.
[22, p. 452]
These four terms come from a background of experimen-
tal and quantitative research. In considering robust ex-
perimental principles in the junction between IT-security
practice and behavioural sciences research, Pfleeger and
Caputo [44] suggest that steps be taken to reduce con-
founding variables and biases, to then support transfer-
ability. Qualitative and case-study based research meth-
ods have analogous principles, although they are derived
and ensured differently. The qualitative research meth-
ods tradition roughly makes the following translations.
Validity [43] usually refers specifically to internal va-
lidity, whereas transferability (or generalisablity) [30]
maps to external validity, trustworthiness [40] and cred-
ibility [29] map to transparency, and containment is ex-
pressed as ethics in research design and execution [11].
A famous principle in philosophy of science is falsifi-
ability: the idea that good theories are those whose truth
can be tested and hypothetically fail [45]. For Popper,
a good experiment is taken to be one that tests an exist-
ing theory. Successful theories pass more tests than oth-
ers. However, one must immediately ask how to design
such an experiment, and what features it should have.
Further, when two results conflict, we must evaluate the
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strength of evidence provided by each experimental re-
sult [39, p. 146]. Our principles provide positive, con-
structive guidance for both these processes that the falsi-
fiability concept does not directly supply. That is, these
principles provide something of the ”how” to experiment
design.
3 Methodology
Our methodology for selecting which principles to dis-
cuss followed two phases. First, we oriented our search
in broad strokes by the categories of desirable features
introduced in the Section 2. These categories are de-
rived from scientific investigation more broadly and en-
joy general support across multiple disciplines, and thus
provide a reasonable starting point. They are also explic-
itly very general, and so require more detailed specifi-
cation for challenges common to our particular field of
interest, user studies in security and privacy.
The second phase of our methodology was to evaluate
and select principles based on our expertise and experi-
ence. We thought it important that studies should be re-
alistic, bias as little as possible and use precise language
and we structured these high-level goals into principles.
The process of specifying them was as follows. First pri-
ority was that we had personal empirical experience de-
signing studies that meet these principles and overcome
the underlying challenge. Thus we prioritised principles
for which we feel we have an adequate and accurate for-
mulation. We also selected principles based on our per-
ception of the importance to a high-quality study, where
high-quality means one can explain adequately how it
meets the four high-level rules of internal validity, exter-
nal validity, containment, and transparency. These prop-
erties are not commensurate, that is they are not mea-
sured in equivalent units and thus are not directly com-
parable. Therefore we employed expert judgement to
decide whether a certain drop in containment from one
common challenge is more or less damaging to study
quality than some certain drop in external validity, for
example. We did not consider a rubric or other counting
exercise to adequately help our principle selection pro-
cess; the qualities are too contextual and rich to so easily
put into bins.
Thus, one may reasonably disagree with our choice of
principles. We would like to stress that the five princi-
ples we propose are what we have found important in
our research and they might not be applicable to all types
of studies and all research areas within usable security
and privacy. As part of future work, our proposed princi-
ples should enable quantitative, empirical measurement
of study outcome differences to further improve study
design understanding. This experience-first strategy is
more likely to produce an incomplete list, but our recom-
mendations are more likely to be accurate. Secondly, we
emphasise our set of principles is not meant to be exhaus-
tive, but only accurate and high-value recommendations.
From this point of view, additional principles of equally
high quality are welcome from the rest of the community
based on others’ study design experience. At present, we
prefer to be somewhat conservative in our coverage and
confident the principles we recommend are accurate and
useful.
4 Results: Principles
Our principles come from one of two angles, roughly
those from security studies and those from user stud-
ies. More specifically, our principles arise from the fol-
lowing two challenges, (1) subject-matter-specific prob-
lems common to security generally interacting for the
first time with techniques for exploring user experience,
and (2) general challenges of human experience stud-
ies that have particularly pervasive or damaging impact
when they arise in security usability. We propose five
principles for robust experiment design; the first three
are security subject-matter issues, and the second two
are general user experience study problems with partic-
ular impact for the applicability of behavioural research
outcomes in IT security [44].
• Give participants a primary task
• Ensure participants experience realistic risk
• Avoid priming the participants
• Perform experiments double blind whenever possi-
ble
• Define these elements precisely: threat model; se-
curity; privacy; usability
These five principles for robust studies in usable secu-
rity are best viewed as subject-matter specific elabora-
tions of desirable experiment-design elements for robust
study design from across the sciences. Although in some
important ways these principles are not new because they
are based on existing ideas, in other important ways these
recommendations are unique because they have been tai-
lored to the specific challenges common to user studies
in security and privacy.
The genesis of our principles is learning from exper-
iments we have participated in or have read about; in
parallel, the target impact of our proposed principles is
to better learn from experiment. We have generated the
principles by learning from shortcomings in our own ex-
periment designs and those of others. However, in order
to best learn from experiments in the future it would be
prudent to follow the principles as recommendations or
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heuristics for overcoming some of the most common er-
rors that arise in usable security studies; thus our princi-
ples are open to future revision, addition, and amendment
as warranted.
We use past work as a series of case studies to elicit
these principles, and use analogy to existing literature in
other fields as evidence that our conclusions are robust
and not mere idiosyncrasies of the cases used. Usable
security makes use of methods from both qualitative and
quantitative research disciplines. A measurement study
may be used on a subset of participants to examine the
extent to which the values reported by the humans match
objective values of behaviour captured by a sensor. For
example, privacy studies have repeatedly identified a dis-
crepancy between reported preferences and actual be-
haviours (e.g., [60, 28]). Therefore we make use of the
study design principles from both traditions, where ap-
propriate. Subsequently, we describe how each of the
five principles relates to widely-accepted generic princi-
ples of good study design.
4.1 Primary task
By giving participants a primary task in a study we make
sure they are put in a realistic situation. In real life, peo-
ple use computers in order to accomplish some task, be
it to send an email, make a purchase or search for infor-
mation, and so security as a task is secondary to a main
purpose.
In usable security research, Brostoff and Sasse [10]
were the first to have a primary task in their study. In
a 3-month field trial, 34 students used an authentication
mechanism called Passfaces to access their course ma-
terials. Although users were positive about the idea be-
hind Passfaces when asked about it, a 3-month trial of
participants using Passfaces and passwords in practice
painted a different picture. The results show that the fre-
quency of logging in to the system dropped when Pass-
faces guarded access to the system; participants logged
in with one third of the frequency when they authenti-
cating using a grid of Passfaces rather than passwords.
Since logging in using Passfaces took longer, more re-
cent research of security behaviours (e.g., [63]) would in
retrospect imply that participants decided that it was not
worth their time to spend a minute logging in only for a
few minutes of work on a system.
Giving participants a primary task while we study their
security behaviour is related to two important features
in usable security. First, users in the real world have
a primary task which is interrupted by performing se-
curity tasks. Including a primary task makes sure the
experiment simulates the real world accurately enough
to be meaningful; this is a form of ensuring external
validity or transferability. A primary task adds exter-
nal validity in another way, namely we know from psy-
chology that human attention and other mental resources
are bounded [59], where such bounds can impact se-
curity [3]. Further to this, users would rather achieve
their goal than be distracted by secondary tasks that di-
vert their attention from the primary task [63]. Her-
ley [19] urges security designers to be mindful of how
much security-related effort is demanded of users, and
to use what is available to them wisely. Having the full
mental resources of a participant available for a security
task in a study setting does not necessarily translate to
that person wanting – or being able – to devote their men-
tal resources solely to security in a more realistic setting.
Giving participants a primary task in a study is not al-
ways appropriate. For example, user testing of a new
authentication mechanism is a multi-stage process from
requirements gathering to evaluation post-adoption. At
one of the early stages, it is advisable to conduct a per-
formance study with users to assess if a security-related
task is achievable. For example, it would be confirmed
whether it is possible to read and enter the digits from an
RSA token into an entry field within the defined expiry
window for a generated series of digits. In research on
CAPTCHAs (Completely Automated Public Turing test
to tell Computers and Humans Apart), many studies have
focused on establishing if a paricular type of CAPTCHA
is decipherable (e.g., [20]). Ideally such performance
evaluations would be complemented with studies to as-
sess user acceptance and suitability in real-life interac-
tions to assess whether solutions are viable in genuine
user populations.
Creating a primary task is difficult, and requires time
and effort. Preibusch [47] provided a guide on how
to study consumers’ privacy choices in the tradition of
behavioural economics and advocated using real-world
shopping scenarios as a main approach. Researchers
should create real shopping scenarios to study privacy
choices; in this instance real means the participant can
browse in an online shop, buy and pay for goods, and re-
ceive them. Studies in privacy have used primary tasks
including purchasing gourmet goods [46], DVDs [5] and
cinema tickets [31]. Some examples of primary tasks
used in security studies include asking participants to
buy goods from online retailers (e.g., [4]) and evaluate
a tool for summarising academic articles [36]. While
all experiments mentioned above were confined to a uni-
versity laboratory, researchers are also increasingly con-
ducting security experiments in the wild. A notable ex-
ample is a field experiment by Felt et al. [17] which
tested six proposed SSL warnings in Google Chrome and
recorded 130,754 user reactions. The research has supe-
rior methodology since the behaviour of actual users is
recorded as they are going about their daily online ac-
tivities, and there is arguably no better primary task than
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the actual one that a user naturally chooses to do them-
selves. However using such superior methodology is not
within reach of most academics and more collaborations
between industry and academia are necessary to make
such studies possible.
4.2 Realistic risk
Like the importance of a primary task, a realistic risk is
part of the design principle of providing a realistic task
environment for study participants, because the poten-
tial for real consequences is part of a realistic experience
of security. Enumeration of the risks of usability failure
is also important to the design of secure systems [67].
Participants are under ‘realistic risk’ when they perceive
there is a threat to the security and privacy of their own
information.
An experiment should introduce realistic risk to par-
ticipants because people behave differently if they know
a situation is a simulation. Lack of a realistic risk threat-
ens external validity, where this threat stems from the fact
that participants’ perception of risk is one of the things
(implicitly) being tested, and it changes if participants
know a situation is a simulation. In this sense, lack of re-
alistic risk causes the experimental results to be solely an
artifact of the laboratory setting, with no adequate analog
in the real world, and so transferability or external valid-
ity is undermined. Participant risk perception variability
also represents a threat to the internal validity of a study
when participants are exposed to different perceived risks
without measuring, controlling, or monitoring those dif-
ferences during the study.
Studies have introduced realistic risk to participants in
different ways. Schechter et al. [54] (described in more
detail below) asked a group of their participants to log
in with their actual credentials to online banking. In a
study by Beresford et al. [5], participants were purchas-
ing DVDs and entered their own details to complete the
purchase and have the products shipped.
The impact of using participants’ actual credentials
has been tested directly. Schechter et al. [54] tasked
their participants with performing different online bank-
ing tasks, and manipulated a range of different website
authentication measures such as HTTPS indicators and
website authentication images. A group of participants
in their experiment used their actual credentials while
others role-played with simulated credentials. The re-
searchers found that those participants who used their
own credentials in the experiment behaved more securely
than those using credentials provided for them.
In a study by Krol et al. [36], participants brought their
own laptops to the laboratory and if they downloaded a
file despite a security warning, it could have potentially
infected their own computer with a virus. In interviews
afterwards, a few participants stressed that if they have
to download something from an untrusted source, they
would do it on a public shared computer in order not to
put their own machine in jeopardy. However, owning
the laptop is not the only element of realism perceived
by participants as 29 out of 120 participants said they
considered the laboratory a trusted environment and as-
sumed that the researchers checked the files beforehand
and would not let them download something malicious.
This fact highlights the need for continued assessment of
users’ perceptions of risk, both before and after studies,
to improve researchers’ interpretation of results and un-
derstanding of user attitudes.
Obviously inserting a realistic risk into a study pro-
tocol causes an interesting trade-off with containment,
however, that must be addressed through the institutional
review board (IRB) process. If the IRB is unfamiliar
with the relevant technologies, the Menlo report [14] pro-
vides a framework for deciding whether the study poses
too much of a threat to prospective participants. The
Menlo report elaborates four principles for information
and computer technology (ICT) research: respect for per-
sons, beneficence, justice, and respect for law and public
interest. These principles are based on ethics in biomed-
ical studies but are thoroughly adapted for the ICT con-
text.
The challenge of creating an ethically sound study
with a realistic risk may lead a researcher to opt for sac-
rificing the external validity and ignoring this principle.
Usually when a study sacrifices external validity it is to
gain internal validity, losing representativeness in order
to more carefully control the effects being studied. When
internal and external validity are exchanged in this way,
it immediately suggests a family of studies, some with
strict controls and some descriptions of the real world
and a gradient of more or less controlled studies in be-
tween, that could be synthesised in order to provide ap-
propriate explanation for the phenomena. Relaxing the
principle of a realistic risk to the participant does not pro-
vide such an exchange; if anything it negatively impacts
both internal and external validity. The research into se-
curity usability has up to this point done a great deal of
work in identifying factors which influence security be-
haviour – increasingly research is finding that the proper-
ties or severity of these factors can encourage a particular
response to security. Individual utility of security can be
influenced by factors personal to them; for example, the
complexity and number of passwords that a person must
manage can – once it reaches a perceived ‘limit’ – en-
courage the reuse of passwords or a reliance on recall
aids such as written notes [2, 24].
5
4.3 Avoidance of priming
Priming is exposing participants to some information
that might influence how they subsequently behave in
the experiment. Non-priming the participant helps avoid
biases such as demand characteristics where the partic-
ipant gives answers based on what they believe the ex-
perimenter expects of them. Non-priming is an issue of
internal validity, but also containment if the researcher
comes into possession of personal or otherwise sensitive
information. Non-priming can be achieved by simply not
telling participants much about the purpose of the study,
it can range from keeping the study description general
to actively telling lies to participants. A common way to
avoid priming is to deceive participants about the actual
purpose of the study. Deception has been used in our
field of research; Egelman et al. [15] advocate deception
for user studies in security and privacy to produce gen-
eralisable findings. Krol et al. [36] told their participants
they were examining a summary tool for academic pa-
pers where in reality they studied participants’ reactions
to download warnings.
Again ethical questions arise from the fact that partici-
pants are lied to. Psychology has traditionally dealt with
this dilemma by requiring researchers to debrief partici-
pants at the end of the study and tell them what the ac-
tual purpose of the research was. However researchers
have warned about potential negative consequences that
might arise from deception. Horton et al. [27] empha-
sise that using deception can make participants distrust
researchers in future studies. Researchers in the field
of economics tend to avoid deception altogether as this
could falsify the research results [26].
4.4 Double blind
In a double blind experiment, both the participant and
the person executing the experiment do not know details
of the study – this limits the capacity for either party to
influence the study outcomes through knowledge of the
study design itself. Traditionally used in medicine [50],
the person executing the experiment would not be in-
formed as to whether a patient is receiving an active
medicine or a placebo. In this way, the designers of a
medical trial hope to avoid a situation where an experi-
menter administering medicine treats the subject differ-
ently or influences the results in any other way. Dou-
ble blind experiment design can improve internal valid-
ity and containment by preventing accidental transmis-
sion of biases, research goals, or sensitive information
between the researcher and the participants.
To the best of our knowledge, experimental procedures
using double blind have been used only once so far in us-
able security and privacy research. Malheiros et al. [41]
studied individuals’ willingness to disclose information
in a credit card application. They employed three un-
dergraduate psychology students to conduct experimen-
tal sessions. The students were told that the study was
exploring individuals’ willingness to disclose different
types of information on a loan application for an actual
loan provider. In reality, the study was looking at partic-
ipants’ privacy perceptions.
As previously, there are ethical considerations with not
telling the entire truth not only to participants but also
the person executing the experiment. Running a useful
double-blind experiment introduces challenges to the ex-
periment design. For example, if the person who exe-
cutes the experiment is unaware of the purpose of the
study, they for example cannot ask specific questions
in response to the participant’s behaviour, which may
be valuable to adequately interpret the participant’s be-
haviour in situ. Debriefing at the end of the study ses-
sion might not be possible as the experimenter is not ad-
equately prepared to do so themselves, and another re-
searcher would need to be present to debrief the partic-
ipant. Such an approach would further require that the
experimenter be debriefed at the end of the study.
4.5 Define: threat model, security, privacy,
usability
There are two important ways in which the researcher
must carefully attend to how meaning is assigned to
terms during explanation and during execution. Firstly,
terms must have precise and well-defined meanings
when articulating the design, protocol and results of an
experiment to colleagues; secondly and more subtly, the
researcher should be careful not to bias participants by
priming them with definitions provided during the course
of a study. In the first case, being clear and consistent
with definitions during experiment design and execution
improves internal validity. This reduces the chances for
error or imprecision that would lead to systemic design
flaws, as would result from confusion of similar concepts
that are actually distinct at the detail level of experimen-
tal examination. Clear definitions improve transparency,
trustworthiness, and credibility when describing and ex-
plaining an experiment. In the more subtle case, it is
generally desirable that the researcher not provide any
definitions of terms to the subject participants, to avoid
biasing the participants’ answers. This sense of atten-
tion to definitions overlaps heavily with the avoidance of
priming, discussed in more detail in Section 4.3.
The terms we find to be most commonly impacted by
definitional problems are threat model, security, privacy,
and usability. These words are central to all research in
the field, so it is both unsurprising and troubling that the
terms are hard to define. Definitional disputes about the
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term information continue in information science, for ex-
ample [66]. The difficulty is unsurprising because re-
search in any field can be interpreted as wrestling with
creating precise agreement for defining the terms and re-
lations among them that adequately describe the mech-
anisms under study. The lack of definition is simulta-
neously troubling because lack of specificity prevents a
genuine discussion about the merits of competing defini-
tions to capture the mechanism adequately and instead
hides behind ambiguity. Researchers should consider
and contrast different terms in forming their own under-
standing to promote their ability to support study partic-
ipants in articulating their own perspectives.
When articulating the design, protocol, and results of
studies, researchers should take as a starting point the
most widely agreed upon definitions. Shared definitions
are critically important to a well-functioning research
culture and community because without shared defini-
tions we cannot genuinely compare results among stud-
ies. Appropriate international standards bodies include
IETF (Internet Engineering Task Force), IAB (Internet
Architecture Board), ISO (International Organization for
Standardization), and IEEE (Institute of Electrical and
Electronics Engineers). If these starting points are in-
sufficient, then the researcher has a firm point of depar-
ture to explain why this is so; however, redefinition must
be careful and must ensure usage does not slide between
different definitions of a term without noting so doing.
The security glossary from the IETF is an informational
document that provides an excellent starting point [58].
Departures from definitions should be clear and justified.
Therefore it is worth excerpting from the RFC for each
of the terms to discuss common departure points.
Threat is “a potential for violation of security, which
exists when there is an entity, circumstance, capability,
action, or event that could cause harm” [58, p. 303]. Note
that this does not define threat model, which is the set of
threats and countermeasures considered relevant to the
system at hand. Considering the relevant set of threats is
essential for the external validity of a study.
Security is “a system condition that results from the es-
tablishment and maintenance of measures to protect the
system,” where the measures taken are suggested as de-
terrence, avoidance, prevention, detection, recovery, and
correction [58, p. 263]. Studies often must contribute to
a specific aspect of security, as it covers a broad range of
activities. Authors would do well to specify which mea-
sures or aspects of the system condition of security on
which their study focuses.
Privacy is “the right of an entity (normally a person),
acting in its own behalf, to determine the degree to which
it will interact with its environment” [58, p. 231]. This
term has a particularly rich history of being difficult to
define cleanly. For a comprehensive overview of the dif-
ferent definitions of privacy see the work of Gu¨rses [21].
Usability is not directly defined by the IETF, however
it is referenced as one of the two requirements for the
availability pillar of the classic confidentiality-integrity-
availability triad. Availability is “the property of a sys-
tem or a system resource being. . . usable. . . upon de-
mand. . . ” [58, p. 29]. This supports the idea that, if avail-
ability is a requirement, an unusable system cannot be
secure. Meanwhile, the failure of the standards to have
even an informational definition of usability while giv-
ing it such a prominent position serves to highlight the
importance of research in usable security. The usable se-
curity community cannot contribute to filling this gap for
the Internet community as a whole if we are not clear
about our own definitions.
A definition of usability is provided in the ISO 9241-
11 standard for “office work with visual display termi-
nals”, as the “Extent to which a product can be used by
specified users to achieve specified goals with effective-
ness, efficiency and satisfaction in a specified context of
use”. In studies, the inclusion of a primary task then
provides an approximation of the context of use, against
which to measure these qualities.
Although researchers need to be clear when communi-
cating their definitions to peers, while conducting stud-
ies the researcher should not provide definitions to the
participants when participant perceptions of these terms
are being studied. Providing or sanctioning responses
threatens the study because it injects a systemic error
in the form of the researcher’s pre-conceived definitions,
threatening internal validity. Methods for avoiding even
accidental transfer of ideas from the researcher to the
participant are discussed in Section 4.3 and Section 4.4
on avoiding priming and performing double blind exper-
iments, respectively.
We are often studying the definitions, because secu-
rity and privacy mean different things to different peo-
ple. The gap between security architect and user defi-
nitions of security is demonstrated by an example study
on CAPTCHAs. Krol et al. [37] asked participants to
make purchases on a ticket-selling website and part of
the check-out process was to solve a CAPTCHA. After
the purchase, participants were interviewed about their
experience. In the security community, the security of
CAPTCHAs is considered in terms of them being solv-
able by humans and not by robots. This is to protect the
system from automated attacks leading to for example
unavailability of the service to actual users. In the study,
when participants mentioned security they did not speak
about how well the CAPTCHAs protected the services
but worried about the security of their own accounts and
personal data.
Defining basic terms can be difficult as their meaning
is often contextual. The challenge is to be precise, con-
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sistent and open to discussion with others.
4.6 Additional considerations
There are two areas which we treat as additional consid-
erations, which are important but for which we have no
direct recommendations: sampling bias, and the impact
of current events on participants’ perception and compre-
hension of security.
4.6.1 Sampling bias
An important consideration that we did not include in the
principles is sampling bias. Sampling bias is, roughly,
when the sample studied in an experiment is not rele-
vantly representative of the population to which the re-
searcher generalises their results. Therefore it is a type
of threat to external validity. Sampling bias is a com-
mon scientific problem which has been studied in both
psychology and information security, and thus it should
not be surprising that user studies in security and privacy
also contend with sampling bias.
In the larger fields of psychology and security, sam-
pling bias has been studied in different ways. Many
psychology research studies have had undergraduate stu-
dents as participants, where a study with a mean partici-
pant age of 19 is not uncommon. Further, studies in psy-
chology often rely on participants drawn from Western,
educated, industrialised, rich and democratic (WEIRD)
societies. Heinrich et al. [23] showed that these partic-
ipants are not representative of all humans and are of-
ten outliers. In psychology, it often appears to be the
richness or complexity of human individuals or systemic
cultural differences that drives sample bias concerns. In
information security, sampling bias is more often treated
as an artifact of the sensor choices or as an artifact inten-
tionally inserted by the adversaries being studied [42].
Sampling bias in information security may be assessed
by technical measures with individual components which
compare the whole sample to the population of available
properties, such as total viable IP addresses [62]. How-
ever, like psychology, the argument for what qualifies
a sample as sufficiently or relevantly unbiased must be
made on a case-by-case basis.
In the field of usable security, sampling bias has al-
ready been discussed in at least two ways. Firstly, there
has been a discussion as to whether samples drawn from
crowd-sourcing platforms are representative of the wider
population [32, 56]. Secondly, some studies have fo-
cused on the security and privacy of hitherto under-
studied populations. For example, Elliott and Sinclair
Brody [16] studied the security and privacy needs of
Afro-American New Yorkers. Bonneau and Xu [7] stud-
ied how character encoding can influence the choice of
passwords for English, Chinese, Hebrew and Spanish
speakers.
In our own studies, we have used pre-screening
to maximise diversity of samples to include users of
different age groups, gender and educational back-
grounds (e.g., [38]). Pre-screening is our best effort to
match our study sample to the population who uses the
technology we are studying. In many cases, we do not
know what subset of the whole human population is actu-
ally our target population of users, which makes targeting
the correct sample particularly difficult. We have not had
participants from non-WEIRD population groups in our
own studies, thus we feel less qualified to talk about how
to address this. How usable security is different from
other disciplines in this respect requires further investiga-
tion, which is why we have not listed formal recommen-
dations in this regard as we have for our five principles.
Our general advice is to be mindful of the bias of one’s
research sample and not to frame any results as if they
were universally applicable, but rather to frame results
as applicable only to the population group(s) studied.
4.6.2 Current events
Participants often need to be considered in their social
context, rather than as isolated individuals. While this
tension is common between psychology and sociology,
it is particularly important in security and privacy user
studies because the social backdrop of information se-
curity has been changing so rapidly over the last two
decades.
In Section 4.5, we elaborated on definitions of threat
model, security, privacy and usability as a means to sup-
port dialogue with study participants as to what these
concepts mean to them. Similarly, participants will de-
velop an understanding of these concepts from the en-
vironment around them. Rader and Wash [48] found
that people develop knowledge of security from both in-
cidental and informal sources. Those who proactively
learnt about security would learn – through sources such
as news articles – about how to protect themselves from a
range of attacks; others would learn incidentally by way
of stories from others, sharing ideas primarily about the
kinds of people who might attack them. Participants’
perspectives about security may then be shaped by cur-
rent events as they are documented and discussed with
others. This may then require researchers to in some
way be mindful of the current events around the time of a
study – participants’ perceptions may not be stable over
time (and distinct studies) as the outside world changes.
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5 Discussion
In this section, we discuss how researchers and practi-
tioners could apply these principles. The principles do
not replace researcher acumen or experience, however
they provide a valuable service for facilitating evaluation,
guiding younger researchers and students, and marking
a baseline common language for discussing further im-
provements.
Our list of recommendations does not trivialise the dif-
ficulty of the research to be done. There is no replace-
ment for the researcher’s experience and skill; yet best
principles to check for when designing, executing, or
evaluating an experiment help in other critical ways. In
weighing the advantages and disadvantages of checklists
as a component of repeated procedures, Klein [35] notes
that checklists should not supplant expertise but can be
used to break complex procedures into repeatable steps.
Most surgeries use checklists, but this improves patient
outcomes only when hospital staff are properly trained
and understand the checklist [12], unsurprisingly. Sim-
ilarly, our mere process of listing these principles is not
sufficient to improve research outcomes.
It may be that researchers in the field of usable secu-
rity and privacy combine experiment tools to respond to
the principles. Bravo-Lillo et al. [8] for instance have de-
veloped a reusable research ethics framework. Ferreira et
al. [18] use a formal modelling technique to define tech-
nical and social threats as a precursor to designing and
running experiments which involve human participants
– such an approach may be applied to define the threat
model for a study.
Security practitioners and developers of automated IT
systems may want to account for the user when building
security mechanisms that require human interaction – re-
search that considers the principles can be more readily
applied within a repeatable framework as advocated by
Cranor [13]. Study of security alongside a primary task
can identify communication impediments; realistic risk
can characterise personal variables; clearly-articulated
threat models can convey how behaviour and security
mechanisms under evaluation respond to anticipated at-
tacks.
6 Conclusions and future work
The five principles presented here provide an excellent
example of learning from past experiments in order to
produce incrementally better experimental designs going
forward. Although we do not claim that the principles
are exhaustive, they provide a fruitful starting point for
reflecting on experimental design principles within the
specific subfield of usable security and privacy research.
The principles of primary tasks, realistic risks, avoiding
priming, conducting double blind studies, and defining
terms are reasonably intuitive from surveying the litera-
ture and have demonstrated benefits.
We recommend that anyone designing an experiment
in usable security and privacy considers these principles
carefully. If, after consideration, the researchers decide
one or more principles do not apply to their study design,
we simply recommend that they explain why when re-
porting their studies. This also serves to more concretely
define the validity of subsequent study findings relative
to the work of others in the field and in the wider world
of security practice.
The work of describing principles that are important
to experiments and other structured observations within
a field is never done. The process is iterative; as helpful
principles are applied more widely in new studies, new
challenges will arise as old best principles are mastered.
To facilitate such advancement of the field, future work
should continually analyse the trade-offs between inter-
nal validity and external validity and the challenges of
providing transparency and containment. With an eye
keen to these potential problems, we can catalogue both
further study designs and their impacts upon the capacity
to capture user experiences of security technologies.
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